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                 Around 1900 Britain was exceptionally suited to pioneering large scale 
enterprises because of the precocious development of its equity markets and London’s 
experimentation with a more eclectic range of corporate governance techniques than the 
world’s smaller and less cosmopolitan financial centers. Information dissemination, 
incentives and reputation – developed by a serendipitous mix of legal compulsions and 
flexible voluntarism – set the scene for the growth of large, UK-based, national and 
international corporations in the twentieth century. 
 
 













 “The investment business is not with us as well developed or as well understood as it is 
in England.” 
                            Lyon, Capitalization, Boston, 1913, p. 207. 
 
 
                                                                        
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful, without implicating them in the outcome, to Terry Gourvish, Ranald Michie, Tetsuji 
Okazaki, Mary O’Sullivan, Richard Sylla and Janette Rutterford, to two referees and to the editors for 
advice.    3
                                                                      I 
 
                     The Chandlerian narrative, though rich in interesting detail on the 
development of organizational capabilities worldwide, went badly awry in its 
internationally comparative perspectives on the first half of the twentieth century in Scale 
and Scope.
2 It is now clear that some of its central drivers – British businessmen 
abnormally wedded to  personal ownership and small management hierarchies, 
Americans quick to professionalize and divorce ownership from control, bank-guided 
Germans leading the move to large plants and firms, family enterprises unwilling to 
reinvest profits for growth, large manufacturing corporations as the main source of 
national differences in economic performance, and early twentieth century global 
oligopolies with pervasive barriers to entry by followers – are more than mildly 
problematic. These stereotypes – and those in the same tradition on France or Japan - 
have often failed to find support in representative, quantified samples, and, in some areas, 
the precisely opposite characterization has turned out to be more accurate.
3 Yet, from 
time to time, non-specialist economists and legal scholars still surface with attempts to 
explain why these things that did not happen in business history must have happened: the 
                                                 
2 Chandler, Scale.  By contrast, his earlier internationally comparative perspectives on the M-form, 
diversification and integration - outlined in Strategy and Structure and developed with Channon, Pavan, 
Thanheiser and Pooley-Dyas in the 1960s (perspectives largely ignored in Scale and Scope) - have 
impressively withstood three tough tests: effectively explaining later business developments, widespread 
implementation in business schools and management consultancies, and critical scholarly analysis, see 
Whittington and Mayer, European Corporation. 
3 For a range of examples, see Berghoff, “End;” Broadberry, Market Services; Cassis, Big Business; Church, 
“Family Firm;” Colli, History; Dunlavy, “Corporate governance;” Fohlin, Finance capitalism; Fruin, 
Japanese Enterprise System; Hannah and Wada, Miezaru;  Herrigel, Industrial constructions; James, 
Family Capitalism; Jones, Evolution; Jones and Zeitlin, eds., Handbook; Kinghorn and Nye, “Scale;” Miwa 
and Ramseyer, Fable; Owen, From Empire; Smith, Emergence; Wardley, “Emergence.”   4
urge to explain what Chandler (and many others among us) wanted to believe is 
enduring.
4  
                   There has been some attempt to explain why key aspects of the Whig 
modernization myth that inspired these false perspectives proved so egregiously wrong, 
but the new perspectives leave many key questions unanswered.
5 Why – given the need 
for massive financial mobilization in their rapidly developing economies - were the 
Berlin or New York Stock Exchanges not as large, relative to their economies, as Paris or 
London? Why did France and Britain lead in divorcing ownership from control? Did that 
do the German or American economies any harm or was their higher level of personal 
ownership actually an advantage? (This perspective was instinctive to Adam Smith, and 
perhaps is again more digestible in our present age of private equity, than it was when the 
managerial modernization myth was at its height.
6) On the other hand, did the quality of 
its corporate governance - or some other factor - explain why Britain’s firms heading 
global oligopolies in the early twentieth century were initially larger and in the long run 
more sustainable than American and German ones?
7 This essay is intended as a 
contribution to what still remains for some a quaintly deviant activity: explaining British 
success. Central aspects of that success that still require explanation were the continued 
                                                 
4 De Long (“Did J. P Morgan’s Men”) and Cheffins (“Mergers”) attempt to show, among other things, why 
corporate IPOs and the divorce of ownership from control advanced further in the USA than in Britain 
before 1914, despite patient reminders from historians - every decade or so - that careful calibration of the 
facts suggest the opposite phenomenon is what requires explanation (see Davis, “Capital markets;” Sylla 
and Smith, “Information;” Hannah, “Divorce”). 
5 Lamoreaux et al (“Against”); Clark and Trebilcock (Understanding Decline); and Hannah (“Whig fable”) 
sketch explanations. One of the most striking reversals of perspectives is David Landes’s recent Dynasties, 
a volume that does not sit easily with the Whig modernization theory he earlier imbibed at Harvard’s 
postwar Research Center in Entrepreneurial History (compare his “French entrepreneurship.”)  
6 Compare Jensen, “Eclipse.” 
7 Hannah (“Marshall’s trees,” pp. 264-5) presents an alternative hypothesis to that explored here, 
suggesting that their international exposure and lack of tariff protection may be factors distinguishing 
British 1912 giants from their less successful American and German counterparts. The latter suggestion 
would be more plausible if it could be shown that British corporations reverted to lower growth and 
survival rates when the British aped American and German protectionism from 1932 onwards.   5
development of London as the largest stock exchange in the world in the early twentieth 
century and Britain’s – perhaps not unrelated – hosting of an (above-par) number of large, 
quoted – and generally managerial and multinational - corporations that performed better 
over the century as a whole than the (somewhat below-par) performance of the economy 
in which they were headquartered. 
 
                                                                       II 
 
                     Around 1900 Britain had similar real per capita GDP to the United States, 
but was little more than half the latter’s economic size.
8 Some of its business activities 
were nonetheless more developed than its modest size would lead one to expect. Most 
spectacularly, it already derived most of its income from the service sector, more than 
half a century before that happened in the USA, and that despite also employing a higher 
percentage of its (smaller) labor force in manufacturing than Germany, France or the 
USA.
9 One key to British exceptionalism, driving its extreme specialization, was its 
unilateral commitment to free trade, which, in turn, had fueled the downsizing of 
agriculture and the precocious size and global reach of its financial sector. In 1902, 
toward the end of a massive company flotation and merger wave that still left the total of 
NYSE-listed securities at only $14 billion, listings on the London Stock Exchange were 
more than three times that level, with a value of $43 billion.
10 Issuing capital to public 
                                                 
8 Maddison (World Economy) suggests that in 1900 the UK had 2.6% of the world’s population and 9.4% 
of the world’s real GDP, against 4.9% and 15.8% for the USA. Maizels (Industrial Growth, p. 220) 
suggests that in 1899 it had 20.8% of the world’s manufacturing production, compared with 40.6% for the 
USA. 
9 Lewis, Growth, p. 263; Bairoch et al., La Population active, pp. 53, 83, 96, 98. 
10 Pratt, Work, pp 81-2; Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1902, p. 1098. These are par values; at market 
the US deficit would have been even wider, because of the greater prevalence of stock watering there. Even   6
investors was cheap for British companies. In 1870-1913, when the dominant issues on 
most stock exchanges were railways, British railway bonds yielded 3.7% and equities 
4.3%, while, in the more capital-constrained USA, railroads paid 6.0% and 8.4% 
respectively.
11 London was a rich, mature savings market with a wall of money avidly 
searching for higher-yielding investments. Its apparently insatiable capacity to absorb 
imported food, raw materials and semi-manufactures created massive investor 
opportunities, in overseas development and  trade, as well as at home. 
                             Limited liability, joint stock enterprise - facilitating low-risk 
contracting between investors supplying funds and businesses requiring finance - had 
clearly made more progress in Britain than in continental Europe. Britain in 1900 had 
about 30,000 joint stock companies, probably as many as all the rest of Europe put 
together: Germany, for example, had only 5,400 Aktiengesellschaften in an economy with 
a larger population and roughly the same GDP as Britain’s.
12 We cannot easily compare 
these figures for European corporations with American data, since comprehensive federal 
statistics for this period are lacking, but we know from the federal censuses that all US 
manufacturing corporations operated 40,743 establishments in 1899 and that there were 
5,386 incorporated mining businesses in 1902.
13 It is likely that the total number of US 
                                                                                                                                                 
if clearly international securities (in which London excelled and the NYSE was hardly a player) were 
excluded, London was larger. 
11 Edelstein, “Foreign Investment,” p. 198. 
12 Wagon, Finanzielle Entwicklung, p. 7, for Germany. Somary, “Statistik” gives a total for around 1900 of 
25,864 companies in continental Europe excluding Scandinavia, Iberia and the Balkans. A general problem 
in interpreting these statistics is that, in some countries, in sectors like railways, banks or utilities, 
companies could be formed outside the general company legislation to which the statistics are sometimes 
confined. 
13 United States Census Office, Manufactures, p.lxvi; Department of Commerce, Mines and Quarries, p. 78. 
The mining figure is the actual number of corporations but the total of manufacturing corporations will be 
less than the figure given, because one corporation may own more than one establishment. In 1954, the 
number of manufacturing corporations was 74% of the number of manufacturing establishments (Carter et 
al., ed., Historical statistics, 3, p. 559). Multi-unit enterprises probably increased their share overall by 
1954, but the 1899 census was the last to include incorporated handworking establishments and other   7
incorporated enterprises for 1900, including the agricultural and service sectors, was 
somewhat in excess of 60,000.
14 If that guess is about right, then about half – and quite 
possibly more than half - of the world’s corporations in 1900 were in the USA and nearly 
a quarter in the UK.
15 The prodigious spread of incorporation in Britain and America was 
no doubt partly because these countries were wealthy and innovative, but the flexibility 
of Anglo-Saxon common law compared with the Roman law commercial codes that 
dominated elsewhere may also explain it.
16 Whatever the reason, in the first decade of the 
twentieth century only a minority of German workers were employed by companies of 
any kind (AGs, GmbHs and Gewerkschaften), whereas a majority of workers in the USA, 
UK and Belgium were already employed by joint stock companies.
17 Germany remained 
pre-eminently a land of personal proprietorships and partnerships, where Handwerk and 
small-scale traditional firms still out-distanced its “modern” corporate enterprises. 
                                                                                                                                                 
marginal producers, so around 75% may be a reasonable ratio to apply then too. That would put the number 
of manufacturing corporations at 30,557. 
14 What is required is a grossing up of the total of 35,943 mining and manufacturing corporations 
(estimated for around 1900 in the previous footnote) by an appropriate factor. Using the ratio of mining and 
manufacturing corporations formed in New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania in 1890-1900 (16,967, see ibid 
pp. 541-547) to the total number of corporations so formed (29,360) as the factor produces an estimate of 
62,196 for the whole USA. The first reliable federal statistics on corporations derive from the 1918 tax 
statistics, at which date there were 273,923 active corporations of which 77,935 were in manufacturing and 
mining (Ibid, p. 496). Using that ratio to gross up would produce a much higher 1900 estimate of 126,331 
corporations in all sectors. The difference is substantially the consequence of the larger proportion of 
financial, retail and wholesale corporations at the latter date. Either financiers and retailers incorporated 
more prolifically in 1900-1918 than earlier, or New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Ohio had few financiers and 
retailers in 1900. The former seems more likely: hence the first estimate is preferred in the text, though the 
fact that there were 13,000 banks alone in 1900 suggests it may be an underestimate if most were 
incorporated. 
15 There were 1,340 companies in India, 4,254 in Japan and many in Canada, southern Africa, Australasia 
and elsewhere to add to the European figure of in footnote, though China had no limited liability law until 
1904. 
16 Some modern literature (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, “Business Environment”) emphasizes the speed and 
cheapness of the company registration process as a determinant of international differences in new business 
formation. As far as I know, there is no similar historical comparison of costs or speed of company 
registration. It is possible, also, that national variations in bankruptcy laws made limitation of liability more 
attractive in some countries than others. 
17 Liefmann, Unternehmungsformen, p. 49; Stamp, British Incomes, p. 215.    8
                        The USA’s precociously ample embrace of incorporation was also 
distinctive in that many of its corporations were effectively “private companies,” with 
small numbers of shareholders, whereas Europe’s incorporated enterprises were more 
likely to be quoted on a major stock exchange. Only 0.2% of our estimated total of 
America’s corporations were in 1900 listed on the New York Stock Exchange (with 
perhaps a further 0.1% trading in the unlisted department), while the equivalent 
proportions for London were around 12% traded (with perhaps half those officially listed), 
for Brussels at least 12% officially listed and for Berlin at least 13% officially listed.
18 Of 
course, enterprises that had incorporated without dispersing share ownership were known 
in most countries (and in Germany had been given a separate legal designation since 
1892 as GmbHs rather than AGs), but such personal and family enterprises appear to 
have been especially numerous among the incorporated businesses of the United States.
19  
                        However, other markets - regional stock exchanges, the New York curb, 
the New York Consolidated Exchange and over-the-counter markets - were probably of 
greater importance relative to the main metropolitan stock exchange in America, though 
over a hundred provincial exchanges also existed in Europe and dozens in Japan. Some of 
the apparently large transatlantic differences in the propensity of corporations to issue 
                                                 
18The London 12% figure is based on the assumption that only 10% of the companies listed in the Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence were foreign-registered companies (as opposed to British companies 
operating at home or abroad). For officially listed companies operating in the domestic economy the 
proportion would be only 2%. The large difference between that and the 12% above is British-registered 
companies primarily operating abroad and provincially quoted companies not officially listed in, but 
tradable in, London, both types being in the denominator of 30,000, quoted and unquoted, British-
registered joint-stock companies. No allowance is made in the German or Belgian figures for companies 
registered in those countries but operating overseas or for any metropolitan trading of provincially listed 
securities. 
19 The number of GmbHs was 4077 by 1900 (Wagon, Finanzielle Entwicklung, p.165). The 1907 British 
Companies a Act also formally recognized the private limited company, an equivalent of the GmbH, with 
less onerous reporting rules than for public companies. Such a separate form was not required in America 
because reporting rules were not stringent anyhow, so “private” companies disclosing little had evolved 
there (as in nineteenth century Britain) without special legislation.   9
publicly traded shares is a reflection of the underdevelopment of the New York Stock 
Exchange relative to rival American securities markets, but it is unlikely that allowance 
for that would invalidate the general picture of rather late-developing US stock markets, 
with fewer companies formally listed on major exchanges than in Europe, and an 
abnormally long tail of essentially private companies.
20 
                        European – and especially British - companies were also more 
internationally orientated than those of the United States. The pound sterling, British 
banks, insurers and accountants, and the English language and corporate and contract law 
were all widely used by businesses overseas, sometimes in locally modified form (there 
were separate incorporation procedures in British Empire countries such as Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong and India, whose locally-registered companies are excluded from 
the British totals reported earlier), sometimes directly (British-registered “free-standing” 
companies operated in some continental countries, the USA, Malaya, Japan and 
Argentina, almost as freely as they did at home).
21 London had twice the population of 
New York partly because it was more of a world city. For example, more than half of all 
banks operating there in 1900 were foreign (or British-owned but primarily operating 
overseas) and half the world’s stock of multinational investments originated from the 
                                                 
20 The evidence in Table 1 below suggests that exclusively provincial quotations would add only 22% to 
the London total market values of securities in brewing in 1900, but in other securities, like domestic rail 
and foreign companies, London was more dominant. 930 of the 5,400 German AGs (17%) were quoted on 
all German exchanges compared with 13% in Berlin alone, suggesting around a quarter (by number, 
possibly less by value) were exclusively provincially quoted (Wagon, Finanzielle Entwicklung, pp. 7, 175-
21). I have not been able to locate any comparable estimate for the USA in 1900 but, for 1928-34, Berle 
and Pederson (Liquid Claims, p. 220) thought that stocks and bonds listed on all other US exchanges would 
be a little less than the total value of the securities of NYSE-listed companies. If that held for 1900 (though 
rail stocks, in which the NYSE specialized, were much more dominant then), that would make the NYSE 
clearly less dominant nationally than Berlin or London. “Over-the-counter” trading in most markets is an 
unknown quantity, but may also have been especially large in America.  
21 “English” rather than “British” law because Scotland preserved an independent, Roman-law-based, legal 
system. However, in corporate matters, Roman-based Scottish law closely mimicked English: a warning 
not to over-interpret the alleged restrictiveness of legal doctrine! On the same theme, demonstrated by 
Franco-American comparison, see Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Legal Regime.”   10
UK.
22 Tariff-free Britain was a massive importer of raw materials and manufactures, as 
well as the world’s largest exporter of manufactures, and free-trading Britons were, 
understandably, adventurous travelers.
23 The securities of more than four thousand 
companies traded in London – compared with only 200 on the New York Stock 
Exchange and around 800 in Berlin - but in Germany (and, even more, in America) they 
were overwhelmingly domestic, while in Britain many – possibly the majority - were 
companies (both British-registered and foreign-registered) operating primarily overseas.
24 
                         The problems of corporate governance raised by the public quotation of 
corporate securities and the associated divorce of ownership from control were, then, 
both exceptionally numerous and exceptionally international in London around 1900. 
They were also addressed by an unusually polyglot and experienced population of 
business leaders. Many British businessmen had been born abroad or had overseas 
experience. British citizens were in the early twentieth century directors of firms as 
diverse as Milwaukee & Chicago Breweries, Eastman Kodak, the Anglo-Californian 
Bank, International Nickel, British-American Tobacco, Canadian Pacific, Van den Bergh 
Margarine, Gebrűder Siemens, Apollinaris, Dynamit-Trust, Sankt Pauli Brauerei, Société 
Générale, Compagnie Internationale des Wagons Lits, Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du 
Nord, Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, Baku Russian Petroleum, 
Burma Ruby Mines, Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, Standard Bank of South Africa, Great 
                                                 
22 Lawson, “Lombard Street;” Whitaker, Almanack, pp. 291-296, 310-320. Dunning’s estimate of 
international investment for 1914 suggests a 46% British share, but it is likely that there had been some 
catch-up – for example, by German and American multinationals - by then. 
23 See, for example, Japan Weekly Mail, 6 January 1900, pp. 20-21, for their dominance of the expatriate 
western community in Japan. 
24 783 domestic companies were officially listed on the London Stock Exchange at the beginning of 1900. 
More than four thousand companies were listed in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. The difference 
is accounted for by companies mainly operating abroad (many officially listed) and provincially listed 
companies (which could also be traded by a London broker).   11
Indian Peninsula Railway, El Aguila , Central Uruguayan Railway, Waikiki’s first hotel 
and the Kirin Brewery. By the same token, London – then, even more than now - was the 
favored second (and sometimes first) home for the affluent bourgeoisie of the rest of the 
world.
25 The British port authorities had long ago stopped inspecting passports (though 
traveling businessmen still found these documents useful for collecting poste restante 
mail and as introduction cards). Many wealthy Americans, like the banker J. P. Morgan 
or the industrialist George Eastman, liked to spend some of their spring or summer in 
London, while rich colonials like Cecil Rhodes or Max Aitken also found outlets for their 
wealth and talents there. 
                   Despite the threatening froth of nationalism and imperial rivalry, Germans 
(and - less frequently - other Europeans) were also welcomed among the foreign-born in 
British boardrooms, including those of leading companies like the Bank of England, 
Vickers, the Union Bank of London, Brunner Mond, Nobel Dynamite, De Beers, GEC, 
Shell and Rand Mines. Corporate boardrooms - in Britain and worldwide – would, after 
the disaster of 1914 and its aftermath, not again benefit from such cosmopolitan diversity 
until the 1990s. While now the appointments of a Briton to head a Tokyo corporation or a 
German to lead a Detroit one retain some power to occasion surprise, their predecessors 
in the early twentieth century went largely unremarked in the cosmopolitan stride of that 
era. Britain’s (and Europe’s) largest industrial, J & P Coats, manufactured sewing cotton 
at its Scottish base and in dozens of subsidiary factories globally; its (German-born) 
managing director, O. E Philippi, was trusted by the Clark and Coats families and 25,000 
other public shareholders (the company had been listed on London since 1890) to direct 
                                                 
25 In 2006, London still had more of the world’s billionaires as residents than any other city, though this is 
now probably more related to tax issues than it was in 1900 (when New York was the leading income tax 
haven, albeit unattractive to rich Europeans).   12
its global operations from its London sales center and was widely respected in British 
business circles. The US-headquartered Singer Manufacturing Company – making the 
machines that used Coats’ sewing cotton – closely paralleled Coats’ extensive global 
manufacturing and sales operations from its iconic new Manhattan skyscraper. In 1905, 
the (American) Clark and Proctor families asked their (British) vice-president, Douglas 
(later Sir Douglas) Alexander, to take over as Singer’s president (the founders’ heirs still 
dominated the 150 holders of Singer’s unlisted stock, which traded only intermittently on 
the curb).  
                       At a time when it took sixty days to travel round the world and 
international communication was by cable, not the more natural telephone, in such cases 
the social cement of a relatively homogeneous, international elite of merchants and 
businessmen, with a common European cultural heritage, no doubt aided global business 
development and interactions. Modern historians may retrospectively date “the strange 
death of liberal internationalism” to the turn of the century period, and symptoms were 
certainly visible, but tens of thousands of entrepreneurs, merchants, financiers, managers 
and clerks in leading port cities like New York, Yokohama, Shanghai, Bombay, St 
Petersburg, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Brindisi and London inhabited a cosmopolitan 
networked world where such forebodings seemed preposterous.
26 A key parameter in the 
emergence of the separation of ownership from control in securities markets - trust - is 
essentially unobservable. Yet, for pioneering industrial shareholders - whether more 
widely dispersed like Coats or in closely held firms like Singer - the demonstrated 
competence of top business professionals like these, bound together by shared loyalties, 
                                                 
26 Compare Bayly, Birth, pp. 464-467, with Beerbűhl and Vőgele, eds, Spinning the Commercial Web.   13
norms and obligations derived from common commercial experiences, made their 
fiduciary role as boardroom trustees for the owners appear unproblematic.
27 
                           Foreign-born directors in London sometimes chose to adopt British 
nationality, though there was little overt pressure from the natives to do so of the kind 
travelers and businessmen in America sometimes complained of, though there were 
inducements for the wealthy and socially ambitious. With suitable charitable or political 
contributions, citizenship might be followed by a knighthood from the monarch (whose 
own surname was, after all, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, until it was pointedly changed, in less 
happy times, to the un-Germanic Windsor). The mining financier, Alfred Beit, of 
Portuguese Jewish descent, was born a German Lutheran in Hamburg. After early 
experience with Dutch and French firms, he made his fortune in the Cape Colony and the 
Transvaal Republic, where his and Cecil Rhodes’ insurrectionary conspiracy to 
overthrow the Boer government failed in 1895. His uncle, Ferdinand Beit, was one of the 
founding financier-chemists of the leading German dyestuffs manufacturer, BASF, but 
Alfred chose to establish what became the world’s leading mining finance house, 
Wernher Beit, in London. As a naturalized British subject, he had a house in Park Lane to 
complement his Hertfordshire country mansion. Endowing British, German and South 
African universities, Sir Alfred Beit, company director and financier, remained on 
friendly terms with the Kaiser, dying in 1906, worth ₤8 million ($39 million). It is not 
easy to brand such a Weltbűrger by mere nationality. 
                                                 
27 Though the border between the corporate and the personal, particularly in closely-held firms like Singer, 
was then weakly drawn, see Bruland (“Babcock & Wilcox”) for evidence that Singer directors used the 
company’s manufacturing facilities to develop business for a company in which they personally (not 
Singer) held stock, behavior that would now be considered fraud on the outside stockholders.   14
                       The fundamental issues that had to be addressed in governing companies 
and mediating their relationship with the providers of capital were, of course, not wholly 
different in Germany, the USA, the Transvaal or Britain. If – as the evolutionary theory 
of the firm suggests – competition and diversity are two prime requirements for benign 
long-run outcomes of institutional experimentation, then the London of 1900 could 
credibly claim the world’s richest commercial “gene pool” from which to start. It hosted 
a broad-based society of financial and organizational tinkerers, that (unlike the parallel 
universe of engineers and chemists transforming the material world) could hardly yet be 
matched by rival business centers; though on some dimensions Paris, Brussels and even 
Berlin came nearer to it than the – culturally diverse but more nationally blinkered – 
financial community of New York. Information, incentives and reputation were – as 
theory suggests they should be - at the heart of the solutions these men found and applied 
in London and worldwide. Cosmopolitan London was well aware that they were not 
addressed by identical methods everywhere and the wide range of economic actors – 
shareholders, stock exchanges, legal and accounting professionals, company boards, 
financiers and governments - that shaped the emerging global system of corporate finance 
centered on London did not suffer from a “not-invented-here” syndrome. There was 
extensive experimentation and foreign companies, banks and nationals could - and did - 
operate freely in London. One of Sir Alfred Beit’s main competitors in South African 
mining finance, for example, was General Mining and Finance, the London vehicle of 
Dresdner Bank. 
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                      However, one institutional innovation central to resolving information 
asymmetries, and later widely adopted globally, was essentially British in origin and – in 
marked contrast to experience on the more regulated continent – essentially voluntarist. 
The remarkable late nineteenth century growth of external auditing of British companies 
was the work of professional accountants under the self-regulating auspices of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England & Wales and of similar self-governing 
professional associations in Scotland and Ireland. When chartered in 1880 the English 
institute alone had 587 members and by 1901 this had grown to 2,831, though some 
worked overseas.
28 Whether working in America, China, France, South Africa, Australia 
or Britain, they had a rapidly growing workload. The number of companies listed in the 
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence - many British-registered and with securities listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, though also some foreign-registered  listed companies 
and others provincially listed and dealt in only “over-the-counter” in London  - grew 
from 1,585 in 1885 to 2,581 in 1895, 4,166 in 1901 and 5,337 in 1915.
29 In 1901, the 
president of the English institute reported that 75% of these companies were audited 
solely by his members, a further 4% partly by his members and 8% by members of the 
Irish and Scottish institutes, leaving only 13% (many of these French and American 
companies) audited by individuals, the corporations themselves or non-members. It is 
                                                 
28 Fisher, “President’s address,” p. 1107. There were also thousands of uncertificated book-keepers (who 
also dominated the USA), as well as members of other regional or specialist professional accounting bodies, 
see Broadberry, Market Services, pp. 122-7. The absolute number of accountants in the USA did not 
overtake Britain until the 1920s and remained lower proportionately to population. 
29Ibid., p. 1109;  Jefferys, Business Organisation, p. 456. The 1901 count omits the small number of 
(mainly American) firms which named no auditor.   16
evident that this represents a relatively high degree of both professionalization and 
externalization of corporate auditing. 
                       The ubiquity of the British company audit, though eventually reinforced by 
legislation, was largely achieved by the voluntary compliance of company boards, 
particularly in industry. The British Companies Acts had included model articles - 
requiring the presentation of an audited balance sheet and profit statement to the annual 
general meeting of shareholders - but these were purely advisory: it was a simple matter 
for a lawyer setting up a limited company to omit that clause, and many did. In the last 
third of the nineteenth century, some businesses – notably railways, regulated utilities 
like gas and electric companies, and banks – were, by legislation or tacit agreement 
(motivated by various, separate public interest considerations) required to publish 
accounts, in Britain (as often elsewhere). Yet the remaining London-listed British 
companies (and many foreign ones listed there) – who were not so compelled - 
nonetheless did so voluntarily before 1900.
30 This process had been considerably assisted 
by Sir Henry Burdett, secretary to the London Stock Exchange from 1881. His annual 
letters to companies, at home and overseas, including some quoted in the provinces, 
requesting copies of accounts, were a constant reminder of the desirability of providing 
timely information to shareholders. Even some large unquoted companies (apparently 
ones contemplating an IPO) were sufficiently impressed by his missives to send 
typewritten copies of their confidential accounts. The extensive archive of several 
                                                 
30 Railway companies were legally required to publish accounts in 1868, life insurers in 1870, gas utilities 
in 1871 and electric utilities in 1882, while even private retail banks tacitly agreed to do so by the 1890s 
(“the Governor of the Bank of England’s eyebrows” and threat of legislation being sufficient). In the USA 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Comptroller of Currency and various state regulatory bodies 
achieved much the same in these sectors. The main distinction in Britain was that external audit was 
typically required, whereas in the USA the companies’ own staff often undertook the work. In both 
countries, the securities subject to compulsory disclosure were then the bulk of domestic securities quoted 
on their major stock exchange by value (though perhaps not, in London, by number).   17
hundred thousand British and foreign company accounts now held at London’s Guildhall 
Library is a permanent monument to his labors.
31  
                  Companies had for several decades been required by the London Stock 
Exchange Listing Committee to publish accounts as a condition of new issues (a practice 
not emulated by the NYSE until 1895).
32 Sometimes, it is true, the Listing Committee 
winked. Unlike their modern descendants, they had no extraterritorial ambitions: foreign 
companies seeking a listing were allowed simply to comply with their own - sometimes 
lower - local standards (US and French companies generally kept to their own standards, 
but Australasian, Transvaal and Argentine companies, perhaps realizing the advantages 
for raising capital, often fell in with the London rules). Even for domestic companies, the 
committee did not require accounts publication of some breweries and shipping lines that 
only issued debentures and preference shares to the public. This was presumably on the 
ground that there was sufficient security on these companies’ extensive real estate 
holdings (pubs) and (equally foreclosable) ships for profits in excess of fixed interest 
                                                 
31 Duguid, Story, p. 351. Burdett left the Exchange acrimoniously at the end of the nineteenth century to 
pursue a (not very distinguished) career as a company director, but his work was carried on by the 
professional team he had built up, who, after 1900, also had the option of a quiet word with the Registrar of 
Companies to initiate prosecutions of some non-compliant companies. Comments in this and subsequent 
paragraphs are based on the British and foreign accounts in the Guildhall Library collection. I examined the 
accounts for various dates between 1899 and 1912 of the largest 52 UK industrials (as listed in Payne, 
“Emergence”), some major American, French and African corporations, and an unsystematic sample of 
smaller company annual reports and accounts. 
32 The NYSE undermined its own authority by allowing stocks of non-compliant companies to trade in its 
“unlisted” department (established in 1885 and not abolished until 1910). There was a supplementary list in 
London, too, with lighter requirements, but some of the largest American industrial companies were in the 
New York unlisted department, while the London official list had massively greater listed company 
numbers and almost all large firms were in it. I do not know of any surviving copy of the supplementary list, 
but companies in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence whose names were not published in the Stock 
Exchange Daily Official List were presumably either in the supplementary list or traded “over-the-counter” 
by London brokers.   18
reasonably to be a private matter, disclosed only to the (unquoted) ordinary 
shareholders.
33  
                             Yet when the British state did finally – some time after their 
continental equivalents, though long before the USA - require more from all companies, 
this affected only a relatively small rump of recalcitrant London-listed companies. 
Legislation in 1900 required companies to appoint auditors, who could not be employees 
or directors, to prepare accounts, and present them to shareholders attending the AGM. 
Wider publication was not legally required until 1907, when balance sheets had to be 
filed annually with the Registrar of Companies.
34 Profit statements were not required 
until the 1929 Companies Act, though, since the balance sheet disclosed reinvested 
profits and distributed profits could be deduced from the dividends, this was an 
insubstantial omission. In fact, all but a few (and those mainly breweries) of Britain’s 
largest domestic industrial companies by 1900 published a balance sheet and profit and 
loss account and some laggards had fallen into line by 1907. By contrast in the United 
States, 43 of the largest 100 industrial companies did not even publish a balance sheet in 
1900, while in continental Europe industrial companies - typically required by their 
national commercial codes to present accounts to shareholders at an earlier date than in 
the common law countries – often did not use trained, external, accounting professionals 
to comply.
35  
                                                 
33 Economist, 12 April 1902, pp. 565-566, for criticism of Ind Coope directors for not publishing accounts. 
Other large breweries still refusing to publish accounts were Courage, Barclay Perkins, Bass and 
Worthington, though Worthington did disclose profits in an annual circular, see Investor’s Review, 8 
December 1900, p. 721. 
34 For public companies only, and this part of the law only applied to newly registered public companies, so 
many pre-existing public companies (or newly registered private companies) still published balance sheets 
voluntarily or because of Stock Exchange listing requirements, not because of state compulsion. 
35 Bunting, Rise, pp. 16-19, 155-156; Fear and Kobrak, “Diverging Paths.” Given the greater size of the US 
economy, Bunting’s American top 100 companies turn out to be the roughly equivalent size range to   19
                        The quality of the reported accounting information is less clear. It is 
logically possible that British businessmen who published accounts at the behest of the 
Stock Exchange (or later the government) did so feeling they could now more perfectly 
bamboozle shareholders by publishing false information than by publishing none at all, 
even though that was clearly not the intention of the Stock Exchange Listing Committee 
or the professional accounting bodies. Historians of British accounting certainly dwell on 
the shortcomings of what was published and there is no reason to dissent from Arnold’s 
decidedly lukewarm judgment, based on checking the published shareholder accounts 
against the internal management accounts of 30 British companies, that corporate 
disclosures of the time, though “not as poor as they might have been”, were sometimes 
“uninformative and misleading.”
36 Part of the problem was that external auditors, though 
formally appointed by the shareholders in the annual general meeting, in practice were 
chosen by the directors. They were no doubt – within the capacious limits of their 
professional standards - somewhat biddable.
37 Depreciation accounting rules were not 
well developed and there remained a wide range of allowable treatments; holding 
companies were not required to consolidate the accounts of subsidiaries; directors could 
create secret reserves by understating profits in good years, raiding them - without 
disclosing this - in bad. Some companies notoriously observed only the letter of the law 
(it was a requirement to publish a balance sheet every year, but the law did not until 1928 
specify that it had to be a new one every year!). 
                                                                                                                                                 
Payne’s top 52, on which I base my comments on Britain. By the time the US compelled publication in 
1933, the level of voluntary/NYSE-induced compliance, of course, had grown and was similar to that 
achieved in Britain in the early 1900s. 
36 Arnold, “Publishing.” See also Hannah, “Takeover Bids;” Lee, “Company Financial Statements;” 
Edwards, Company Legislation, pp. 3-5, 12-13; Kennedy, Industrial Structure, pp. 125-6. Of course, apart 
from weaknesses in contemporary accounting standards, some auditors were plain incompetent, as cases 
such as Dumbell’s Bank and the London & Globe scandals of 1900 showed. 
37 Ingall and Withers, Stock Exchange, pp. 124-131.   20
                     Plainly, this was not a world of rigorously prescribed rules (such as modern 
regulators impose in onerous detail), but it was a world of shared values or standards 
(that is, broadly understood norms of good practice which directors and accountants – 
and sometimes, in extremis, judges – could be expected to enforce). We perhaps 
underestimate the power of Victorian cultural norms of professional, reasonable and fair 
behavior in enabling securities markets to work effectively, even with what by modern 
standards appear as poorly articulated disclosure laws and investor protections.
38 The 
great majority of companies in fact published more and better information than was 
legally required and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, this was treated by 
contemporary investors as broadly accurate. Shareholders would rationally peruse 
company accounts with some skepticism, but that externally audited accounts conveyed 
some information – and that directors generally and willingly used them to signal their 
more-or-less-honest views on the sustainability of declared dividends – were taken for 
granted. The informational content was weak, if judged against a hypothetical ideal, but it 
was not nugatory. Significantly, scholars making comparative rather than absolute 
judgments, have usually ranked British disclosure standards highly in the period around 
1900: Sylla and Smith, for example, conclude that Britons then had “the best information 
possessed by any investors anywhere.”
39 The editor of the Wall Street Journal agreed, 
warning British investors in 1900 of the exceptionally poor disclosure even by recently 
                                                 
38 Compare Coffee, “Do Norms.” 
39 Sylla and Smith, “Information,” p. 190; see also Hawkins, Corporate Financial Disclosure, for evidence 
this view was shared by contemporary Americans, worried by the failure of their own legislators and others 
to match it. Kobrak and Fear (“Diverging Paths,” pp. 16, 21) also suggest limited German external audit 
capacity/quality in this period. It should be noted, however, that we do not, as far as I know, have overseas 
studies of the quality of Arnold’s UK study, so it is difficult to make such comparisons authoritatively.   21
floated American industrials that did publish accounts: “their annual reports are nothing 
but mockeries - with a very few honourable exceptions.”
40 
                      Most of the thousands of company accounts published annually in Britain 
were also in a reasonably standard form: remarkably whether for a railway worth 
hundreds of millions or for a one-million-pound restaurant chain. They consisted of a 
balance sheet with some breakdown of assets and liabilities and a profit and loss account 
showing broad aggregates and their allocation (but not, typically, what were still 
considered commercially sensitive matters like sales revenue). Published accounts only 
rarely exceeded four pages and the reports generally did not contain extensive or detailed 
remarks on the company’s business, but that was sometimes the subject of the chairman’s 
AGM speech, usually reported in the press and often also circulated to shareholders. Few 
British companies provided the impressive mass of operational and financial detail that 
was given from 1902 in the published accounts of US Steel (prepared by the British 
accountants, Price Waterhouse), though that steel giant was then also a somewhat 
exceptional US firm, assiduously courting the role of the “good trust.”
41 Against the case 
of America’s largest industrial firm stood its second largest, Standard Oil, quoted only on 
the curb until 1920 and publishing no information on its assets or profits save its capital 
stock and annual dividend. It was what was known at the time as a “blind pool” - 
accounts were a private matter for the Rockefellers and other directors, not available to 
mere stockholders – and, as we have seen, many American industrials followed this 
                                                 
40 Letter from Thomas F. Woodlock, dated 20 December 1900, published in Economist, 5 January 1901, 
p.15. 
41 Among those in London with comparably extensive detail in reports published around the turn of the 
century were some South African mining firms, while railways and utilities disclosed information on sales 
and other issues (sometimes through other disclosures than the annual report) on a regular basis. French 
reports and accounts in the Guildhall collection are more extensive than the average British one.   22
approach. There was something to be said for the standard British norm, most obviously 
for investors interested in making comparisons between possible industrial investments.  
                         This is palpable in the financial journalism of the time. The ethics of 
financial journalists in the early twentieth century - worldwide - are not a topic for the 
squeamish, but occasionally periodicals and newspapers rose above the venal norm. The 
range and quality of discussions of corporate accounts data – on matters like the degree 
of interest cover for preference dividends or long-run industry trends in rates of return – 
in British journals aimed at investors - the Economist, Statist and Investor’s Review - 
were, in my judgment, higher than in New York’s Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle.
42 This favorable view of London information sources is not universal: 
Nicholas, for example, believes that in New York “independent investor services like 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s provided an antidote to asymmetric information,” an 
advantage he thinks London lacked.
43 However, that optimistic interpretation requires an 
unsupported faith in these publishers’ ability to do more than collate the, often inadequate, 
accounting information disclosed by American industrials.
44  Probably more significant 
                                                 
42 This judgment is based on a complete reading of three years’ issues of the four journals for 1900-1902. In 
January 1900, for example, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle contained serious comparisons of the 
accounts only of US banks and railways, while the Economist had comparative, accounts-based, articles on 
UK stores and trading companies, leading domestic industrials, London dock companies, Australian 
railways and “Westralian” mining; while the Statist excelled, with articles on the accounts of Rand gold 
mines, “Westralians,” Indian mines, Australian hardwood companies, colonial life insurance and UK 
railways, life insurance, fire insurance, banks and coal mines. The Investor’s Review published some 
similar articles (for an example in brewing see Table 1 below), but added a distinctive approach in regular 
articles analyzing shareholders’ registers, with a view to diagnosing potential moral hazard from insider 
dealing by directors or large shareholders. 
43 Nicholas, “Enterprise,” p. 236. 
44 The published Moody and Poor volumes for the early twentieth century USA sometimes point to the 
absence of accounts for industrial companies, occasionally guessing at what such accounts might have 
contained. It is not obvious that such guesses were superior to information derived from externally audited 
accounts in comparable British concerns. A perusal of John Moody’s autobiography (The Long Road) 
betrays no convincing secret weapon, beyond a principled unwillingness to accept a bribe from American 
Tobacco for falsifying information and insider gossip at the Waldorf Astoria. There were honest men and 
hotels in London, too. The Poor and Moody volumes have one clear advantage over their London 
counterparts, Burdett and Skinner, in that they report far more accounting details for companies that did   23
for well-informed specialists were the confidential trade reports on corporate 
creditworthiness of Dun & Bradstreet, but these were, of course, paralleled by Seyd’s 
subscription credit rating service in London.
45 
                       Accounts were the most visible means of information transmission in the 
financial markets, but that does not necessarily mean that they were the most important. 
Mining engineers and geologists, for example, were a source of external information on 
the mining market, a sector chronically prone to misinformation. Lawyers also played a 
part. One of the leading City law firms, Slaughter & May, had learned the hard way from 
judicial criticism in the early 1890s of the dangers to their reputation of dubious stock 
exchange dealing. The partners were, thereafter, scrupulous in their insistence on fair 
disclosure to shareholders on the boards on which they sat.
46 Another City law firm and 
other professionals provided more direct advice and diversification services for investors 
by launching successful investment trusts.
47 
                        For other information channels so much of what happened can only be 
guessed at. When an IPO was oversubscribed, vendors and promoters often gave 
preference to the suppliers or customers of the floated firm, not only cementing their 
loyalty but incidentally increasing the trade knowledge of the average shareholder. As it 
was also common for the promoters and/or vendors of enterprises to remain on the board 
after a public issue, often retaining a major shareholding, it is likely that they also 
monitored the share price with some knowledge and interest. Such insiders and trade 
                                                                                                                                                 
publish accounts, but this simply reflects the fewer corporate quoted securities American directories had to 
cover, and specialist publications (Duncan on breweries, Rylands on coal, iron and steel, Garcke on 
electricals etc) proliferated for similar coverage in Britain. 
45 Seyd’s confidential archives do not appear to have survived, unlike Dun & Bradstreet’s (in the Baker 
Library, Harvard Business School), but their limited print versions circulated to subscribers are available as 
copyright deposits in the British Library. 
46 Dennett, Slaughter, pp. 98-105, 120-125. 
47 McKendrick and Newlands, “F & C,” pp. 13-19.   24
investors may have been inclined to sell when they considered the share price too high 
and to buy when they considered it too low. The range of information they used in 
making such decisions would, of course, have been wider, deeper and more timely than 
that incorporated in the published annual accounts. This would have had the desirable 
effect of aligning share prices with underlying values, increasing confidence in the share 
price as a conveyor of information. The concern that more ill-motivated insider dealing 
(in corners and ramps) might have the opposite effect appears to have been less an issue 
in London than in New York, perhaps because some technical differences between the 
markets made such behavior less prevalent in London.
48  
                      There is also some evidence that banking firms like Rothschilds played a 
role in share price formation for large internationally traded stocks like Anaconda, 
Consolidated Goldfields and Rio Tinto (in which they were significant investors), 
monitoring London Metal Exchange prices and share quotations in New York, Paris and 
London.
49 For many smaller stocks, the survival of vigorous provincial exchanges in this 
period also argues for local networks remaining a significant source of business 
information. The London market provided a pool of liquidity for the larger provincial 
issues, but parallel trading on the provincial exchange facilitated information inputs from 
local investors with more expert or insider knowledge. Hence the Liverpool Stock 
Exchange specialized in shipping and insurance, Manchester in textiles, Birmingham in 
bicycles, Glasgow in iron and tea, Sheffield in steel and so on. More distant exchanges 
also played a tributary role, signaling their special expertise and contributing to London 
                                                 
48 Michie, London and New York, pp. 266-7. Sylla and Smith (“Information,” p.195-97) interpret the 
contemporary opposition of some in the Wall Street oligarchy to higher accounting standards, as motivated 
by a desire to preserve their profits from insider information. 
49 Ferguson, World’s banker, pp. 876-81.   25
price formation: Toronto for Canadian industrials, Johannesburg and Sydney for mining, 
New York for American rails, Alexandria for Egyptians, Buenos Ayres for Argentines, 
Paris and Brussels (as well as St Petersburg) for Russian securities. As one American 
commentator remarked, contemporary investors used stock exchanges because they 




                                                                     IV 
 
                     Shareholders were, of course, not just interested in passively noting 
information from directors – or from market prices - about their company, but also in 
ensuring that the board pursued investor interests. The question of director incentives was, 
of course, what had led Adam Smith and others to be so skeptical of the future of joint 
stock enterprise and is central to modern discussions of the principal-agent problem.
51 
One of the simplest ways of harmonizing the interests of shareholders and directors was 
to ensure that the directors were very substantial shareholders, though this was less 
common in Britain than in America, Germany or France.
52 Although many companies 
specified a minimum qualifying shareholding for directors, this was often only a tiny 
proportion of the capital, particularly in the case of large banking or railway enterprises. 
More importantly, company promoters encouraged vendors of businesses to retain a 
substantial shareholding and remain as directors, to give the public company the benefit 
of their experience, though sometimes the newly enriched families wished to employ 
                                                 
50 Conant, “Function,” p. 437. 
51 Smith, Wealth, p. 700. 
52 Hannah, “Divorce.”   26
professional managers and pursue cultural, political or social interests elsewhere. Where 
– as was also frequently the case – vendors did want to retain a key role, the London 
Stock Exchange listing requirement meant that they could not retain more than 33% of 
any listed security (larger holdings were commonly retained by owning families in Berlin, 
Paris or New York). Directors in Britain typically received fees for the job, which were 
publicly disclosed, whereas in America in this period they often did not (it was assumed 
they were remunerated as stockholders).
53  
                     On the other hand, broader share ownership in the UK did mean that the 
threat of removal by the shareholders was more real. Plutocratic control and board 
entrenchment via voting trusts or director protections in New Jersey and Delaware law in 
the USA inhibited shareholder actions there, but legal suits against negligent directors 
and shareholder votes on substantive governance issues actually happened in the UK, 
particularly in the tail of smaller quoted commercial and industrial businesses that 
characterized the more extensive British market, where only a few hundred shareholders 
could carry a meeting.
54 Some central London venues, like the Cannon Street Hotel, 
could accommodate around a thousand shareholders and sometimes did, while in 
Germany or America more than several dozen attendees were exceptional. No major 
British railway company chairman could claim, with the president of the USA’s Great 
Northern, that he had chaired shareholder meetings with no one present.
55 Well-
performing boards could, of course, usually command a controlling majority of 
                                                 
53 Executive salaries were not, however, disclosed, so the aggregate rewards of a British full-time managing 
director could be concealed. 
54 The Economist from time to time contained denunciations of the poor shareholder safeguards in the USA, 
for example 10 May 1902, p. 733. Directors in Germany, as in the UK, were pressured to leave for bad 
performance, see Fohlin, Finance Capitalism, pp. 215-218. 
55 Testimony of James Hill, Pujo Committee, Evidence, p. 1953.   27
shareholder votes (and some chairmen came to the AGM armed with proxies sufficient to 
defeat dissidents), but, when performance slipped, it was not uncommon for 
shareholders’ committees to be elected by the meeting to enquire further into past 
mistakes or to monitor the directors’ currently promised remedies; in some cases such 
committees replaced some or all of the incumbent directors. Shareholder vigilance helped 
attenuate agency problems, though, of course, directors could still act in their own 
interests rather than the company’s, provided they did not do so too transparently and 
egregiously.  
                         Several structural options to align the board’s interests more closely with 
those of shareholders were also being explored. The continental commercial code model 
of board remuneration by Tantiemen or tantièmes – supercharged board rights to 
substantially larger shares of incremental profits after a pre-determined trigger point, like 
payment of a 5% ordinary dividend – were similar in effect to some modern management 
options (also matching modern potential problems of perverse incentives for directors to 
engage in excessive risk-taking or accounting misbehavior). Nothing similar was 
enshrined in British statute law, but the same incentive effects could be achieved by 
parallel common law innovations. Founders’ shares – sometimes also called deferred 
shares – were sometimes issued to vendors, promoters or directors, with dividends on 
these kicking in only when all prior charges had been paid and a basic ordinary dividend 
had been declared, giving the board strong incentives to grow profits. As with Tantiemen 
(which were eventually abandoned on the continent), such incentives, if successful, 
caused some shareholder resentment and could cease to be effective. Some very valuable 
founders’ shares in gold and diamond mining enterprises were bought out in the early   28
1900s. In Harrods department store, the professional directors, who had taken over from 
the founding family when the company was floated, were so successful that their ₤1 
founders’ shares were worth ₤200 each, so they floated them as a separate company in 
1895 to cash in part of their interest, thus somewhat diluting the intended incentive!
56 
                     The most extreme form of incentivising the directors was, of course, to 
leave all the upside in their hands. One way round the London listing requirement that the 
vendors retain no more than one-third of any security was to list only fixed interest bonds 
and/or non-voting preference shares (to each of which the one-third rule was separately 
applied), with the directors or owning family retaining all the ordinary shares (which 
typically carried voting control and rights to all residual profits). The public preference 
shareholders and bondholders were then concerned only with their fixed dividends and 
interest payments: effectively the boards of such companies had sold investors cash flow 
rights but not control rights. Business historians tend to emphasize the effect of this in 
entrenching allegedly inefficient family management, but this pessimistic assessment 
ignores the incentive effect, which has received more attention in the finance literature.
57 
Before such a company flotation, if a family mismanaged the business and profits fell to a 
third of the previous level, they merely reduced their own income; after such an 
arrangement, similar mismanagement would typically cost them their whole income (i.e. 
the ordinary dividend): hardly an incentive to coast along. There was a similar 
encouragement to good performance on the upside: any improvement in performance 
above the norm envisaged when the capital structure was fixed went to the owning 
directors, not to the fixed interest security holders. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
                                                 
56 Statist, 23 March 1895, p. 377. 
57 Zingales, “Insider ownership.”   29
companies that adopted such a structure around the turn of the century – companies that 
included Imperial Tobacco (cigarettes), GKN (metal fastenings), Lever Brothers (soap) 
and Worthington (ale)– did have continuing  - but declining - family involvement in 
management. They were also among the top-performing and long-lasting public 
companies of their day.
58 
 
                                                                    V 
 
                  The third aid to overcoming agency problems, along with information and 
incentives, was reputation. There were, of course, in all markets a mixture of rogues and 
saints and quite a lot of people who came somewhere in between. It was important that 
the rogues were locked up, when something damaging could clearly be pinned on them, 
and also, more positively, for investors to learn to recognize honest directors who could 
be trusted. There was a danger in stressing the negative and relying too much on detailed 
legal prescription, if that simply discouraged financial innovation. Many thought the 
German bourse law of 1896 came into that category, for example in its restrictions on 
futures trading: Deutsche Bank responded by moving many of its international securities 
activities to London. Dr Georg von Siemens, Deutsche’s president, publicly attributed the 
                                                 
58 Gomes (“Going Public”) has modeled a multi-period dynamic game, in the presence of moral hazard and 
asymmetric information, that will result in effort by family directors to develop a reputation, so that they 
can more profitably divest their holdings in the long-run. This is not a bad description of what happened in 
many such British (and overseas) companies. It is one possible resolution of the paradox that some capital 
markets developed well, in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, without very much in 
the way of formal protections for minority shareholders, protections that are considered by modern 
financial economists to be a key reason why securities market are larger today in some countries than 
others.   30
superiority of London as a financial center to the unwise German legislation, though it 
was 1909 before the over-restrictive German law was significantly modified.
59  
                         On the other hand, many thought that America’s inter-state competition to 
reduce corporate supervision to the absolute minimum led to laws that were too lax. The 
license to lie or conceal vital information from outside investors in prospectuses and 
merger offer documents in America, was, for example, extreme. British governments 
generally left these matters to stock exchange and accounting self-regulation, but good 
practice was enshrined in law where MPs with financial, business and legal expertise 
agreed it could be effective. For example, the British law on prospectuses was tightened 
up in 1900 and the next year the fraudulent financier, Whittaker Wright, was extradited to 
the UK from America and convicted for behavior which he would have got away with 
there.
60 
                        The creation of a culture where prudence was valued and risk-taking was 
rewarded also relied on more positive reputational reinforcement mechanisms. One of the 
signals that investors looked for was the track record of directors of companies that were 
being offered to the public. Promoters and financial intermediaries who wanted to be in 
the business for the long run would strive to appoint directors with a good reputation. As 
we have seen this sometimes meant encouraging vendors to stay on, but other reputations 
could also be leveraged in directorships. The most obvious concrete manifestation of 
such a mechanism is the publication of directories to facilitate the reading of this quality 
signal. London’s first Directory of Directors had been published by Henry Kent in 
                                                 
59 Economist, 13 October 1900, p. 1437. 
60 Moody, Truth, pp. 365-9. See also Hannah, “What did Morgan’s Men,” for evidence of deliberate 
concealment of information from New York investors by J. P Morgan in the 1901 US Steel issue that was 
already criminal in London.   31
1736.
61 At the time it was perhaps most useful for identifying counter-parties for notes 
and bills, but company directors’ reputations were already valued by shareholders. John 
Freame, of Barclay & Freame, for example, was then pioneering the business of 
corporate reconstruction by bankers.  He had financed the London Lead Company’s 
smelting innovations early in the century, with both loans and equity, but when corrupt 
dealings by the company’s directors were suspected, he helped expose them and in the 
1730s re-financed and ran the company.
62 Directories showing the board portfolios of 
directors proliferated in the home and overseas railway booms of the 1840s and 1850s 
and the Directory of Directors assumed its modern, annually revised, form in 1881, when 
the leading London financial publishers, Skinner, took it in hand. Other financial centers 
began publishing directories of directors later: the Berlin and New York volumes both 
date from 1898. 
                          Of course, quality signals from directors’ reputations could be ambiguous 
or downright misleading. The “signal” that attracted the most negative comments was the 
appointment of aristocrats or elected members of parliament to boards (a problem 
criticized in republican France as well as in Britain). The principle was a sound one: such 
people had a reputation won elsewhere, which they were essentially posting as a bond for 
good behavior as a company director. By 1896 over a quarter of the British peerage were 
company directors, while a sample of over 600 companies in 1895-1904 suggests that the 
typical company had at least one member of recognizable, if less exalted, elite groups on 
the board.
63  However, there was a plain moral hazard in this commercial market for 
                                                 
61 Kent, Directory. 
62 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays, pp. 13-14.  
63 Thompson, English Landed Society, p. 307; Braggion, “Credit Market Constraints,” Table 1.2. Braggion 
includes knights, baronets, M.P.s and J.P.s, as well as the nobility, in his elite. There is, of course, an   32
reputation and, even if the director himself intended no harm, his signal could be 
misappropriated. Hence the incompetent dummy director - or “guinea pig” (director’s 
fees were usually expressed in guineas not pounds) - became a Victorian figure of fun in 
the operettas of Gilbert and Sullivan.
64 Some of the most roguish company promoters 
were, in fact, members of the House of Commons who found their gift of the gab more 
lucrative in financial misrepresentation than in politics. Several – like Jabez Balfour M.P. 
and Horatio Bottomley M.P. - ended up in the criminal or bankruptcy courts and jail. The 
corrupt promoter, Sir Ernest Hooley, claimed in court to have paid aristocrats between 
₤500 and ₤25,000 each to front his IPOs, though this may have been as inventive as his 
watery prospectus capitalizations of companies like Schweppes and Dunlop.
65 Another 
fraudulent promoter, Whitaker Wright, used Lord Dufferin, the retired Governor General 
of Canada, and other gullible peers without business experience, as dummy directors of 
his London & Globe Corporation. Its collapse at the end of 1900 caused investors to lose 
an astounding £7 millions through market-rigging of mining shares, aided by brokers and 
jobbers who went unpunished by a toothless stock exchange committee.
66  
                  Yet, it is too easy to conclude from such appalling cases that signaling by 
director reputation generally did not work. Successful prosecutions of wrongdoing can be 
cited as evidence of effective disapproval and discouragement of such behavior, rather 
than of its prevalence: the jailing of an Enron executive is not usually held to demonstrate 
that all Harvard Business School graduates are crooked. In fact, the higher ratios of 
                                                                                                                                                 
apparently contrary argument in the Wiener thesis: that Britain’s aristocrats was profoundly averse to 
modern business. Dedicated “declinists,” of course, have no problem in reconciling the two: it is a very bad 
thing when aristocrats join industrial boards and betrays a deep national cultural flaw when they do not! 
64 Gilbert, Utopia, p. 434. 
65 Harrison, “Joint-stock Company Flotation,” pp. 174-6. 
66 Ingall and Withers, Stock Exchange, pp. 108-109; Investor’s Monthly Manual, 31 January 1901, p. 2.   33
market prices to nominal (par) share values in London (and Berlin and Paris) suggest 
significantly less capital watering by promoters there than in New York. The fraudulent 
MPs were exposed, expelled from parliament and imprisoned and the British press could 
be withering in its censure of those whose reputations were corruptly or incompetently 
for hire.
67 Wright found the aristocratic establishment arraigned against him when he 
tried to secrete his ill-gotten gains after bankruptcy: the shame was so great that he took 
arsenic to avoid serving seven years. American equivalents might remain on the Social 
Register, or, as the New York Evening Post bitterly described the contrasting outcome 
that they believed Wright would have faced over the water, “walk the free air, lavish in 
their philanthropies, lauded in the pulpits as exemplars for our youth.”
68 
                  Many elite directors, with some native shrewdness, business experience and a 
lot more to lose, successfully posted their reputational bond as a guarantee of company 
quality with more positive outcomes. Lord Salisbury, who, in 1900, as prime minister, 
governed Britain and much of the world under the Pax Britannica, had served his 
apprenticeship in senior administration as the (very effective) chairman of the Great 
Eastern Railway, nursing it from bankruptcy to prosperity in 1868-1872.
69 At the same 
time, the Duke of Marlborough and other peers served on the initial board of Land 
Securities as it raised the launch capital for its successful life as a leading real estate 
                                                 
67 See, for example, the criticism of Sir Seymour Blane in Economist, 23 November 1901, p. 1730. 
68 Quoted in Moody, Truth, p. 368. On the other hand, CharlesYerkes, the Chicago fraudster, was hounded 
out by local opinion and made a new career in London; while a local British rogue, Sir Ernest Hooley, 
managed repeatedly to mislead investors, despite several exposures and bankruptcies. The protections in 
the UK were stronger than in the USA, but still weak. However, it is perhaps worth noting that the ones 
who got away lightly, Hooley and Yerkes, left behind worthwhile (if temporarily over--priced) industrial 
undertakings and an electrified London underground, while Wright left behind a tissue of lies, hot air, and 
low-value mining claims. 
69 Barker, “Lord Salisbury.”   34
company.
70 Sometimes economic ministers out of office and retired senior civil servants 
embarked on careers as company directors.
71  
                      While rogue promoters might seek “guinea pigs” in these markets, others 
more benignly sought to match acknowledged expertise with legitimate investor demands 
for reassurance. When the American entrepreneur, George Eastman, floated his global 
holding company for Kodak on the London Stock Exchange in 1898, he appointed Lord 
Kelvin (a noted Glasgow professor of physics, who also ran his own marine instruments 
business) and members of the British political elite to the board. Investors who trusted the 
signal had no reason to feel this was a misjudgment. The combination of Kodak’s product 
reputation and these quality certifiers was sufficient to make Eastman’s London IPO a 
success and Kodak proved an excellent London-listed investment in the long run (while 
in New York it was only traded on the curb, even after Eastman, for tax reasons, moved 
the corporate headquarters from London to Rochester). Whether such directors made any 
large contribution to management doubtless varied, and, in Kodak’s case, that was plainly 
not the prime intention. It appears likely from the many such cases which did not turn out 
badly that the signal of director reputation may have been more positive than its generally 
harsh treatment in the literature suggests. Moreover, it might also have delivered more 
than boards merely disinclined to perpetrate fraud on their shareholders: Braggion found 
a correlation between elite representation on British boards and corporate growth in the 
1895-1904 period.
72 
                                                 
70 Rutterford, “Company Prospectus.” 
71 Cassis, City bankers, pp. 64-66. 
72 Braggion, “Credit Market Constraints.” He interprets this as an indicator of elite access to informal credit 
networks, rather than director quality signalling.   35
                      Worldwide, perhaps the most ubiquitous board quality certifier was the 
banker. J. P Morgan, puzzled that his Congressional tormenters on the Pujo Committee 
should single it out as a sign of wickedness, correctly remarked  in 1912 that the new 
American practice of appointing bankers to boards was about as old as the European 
company. Bankers came in many shapes and sizes in an advanced financial market like 
London and there is something of a consensus that they were divorced from British 
business and played a smaller role on corporate boards than elsewhere. The evidence 
suggests a less black-and-white conclusion. Given that the most culture-free definition of 
a banker is someone who can borrow more cheaply than he can lend, it is hardly 
surprising that their reputation was considered one of the most unimpeachable and that 
they were particularly valued as board members, in Britain as elsewhere.
73 
                          Cassis’s careful analysis of directorships held by 460 London bankers 
identifies industrial companies as an area with relatively low banker representation: he 
suggests only 24% of large British industrial companies had a London banker on their 
board in 1905.
74 Yet this “low” figure is slightly higher than the average figure for all 
joint-stock companies (including banks themselves) in Germany (a country 
conventionally held to have extensive banker representation). In the same year, 1905, 
only 23% of German AGs had a banker on the board (only half of these from the 
Grossbanken, which are commonly supposed to have had a critical monitoring role).
75  
                                                 
73 Bankers who could not borrow more cheaply than they could lend – like those who had lost reputation – 
did not remain bankers for very long. Those who consider that General Electric – which can also borrow 
more cheaply than it can lend – is an electrical manufacturer, not a bank, have not read this company’s 
recent annual reports. 
74 Cassis, City bankers, p. 177. 
75 Fohlin, “Balancing Act,” p. 18; though Fohlin, Finance Capitalism, p. 134 reports a higher figure (56%) 
for an 1898 sample of Berlin-quoted firms, and both these samples include a lot of small German 
companies: smaller British industrials were probably less likely to have a London banker on the board. On   36
Moreover, Cassis shows that, among his London bankers in 1890-1914, service on non-
industrial boards was much more common: only 7% of bankers were on the boards of 
industrial companies, 7% on utility boards and 8% on mining boards, but this rose to 49% 
who held insurance directorships, 31% on investment trust boards, 24-42% with railway 
directorships (the largest quoted companies of the day) and 12% in shipping.
76 London 
bankers sat on boards as diverse as French, Austrian, Argentine and British railways, the 
big London insurers and investment trusts, Cunard, Anglo-American Telegraph, Shell 
Transport & Trading, Mexican Eagle Oil, Consolidated Goldfields, De Beers, Guinness, 
Vickers, Fine Cotton Spinners & Doublers, and United Alkali. Only 22% of the London 
bankers sat on no boards, while 20% sat on five or more. If provincial bankers, 
stockbrokers and the more respectable company promoters who cultivated long-run 
business (like John Ellerman, JuliusWernher or Henry Osborne O’Hagan) were added, 
the percentage of companies with “finance” representatives on their boards would be 
even higher. These activities cannot be directly compared with the German banker 
representation figures (definitions in both numerators and denominators differ and they 
are incompatibly disaggregated), but the propensity of public company boards to include 
financiers did not differ as markedly between the two countries as is sometimes 
suggested. 
                       Of course, the role of the bankers on boards differed between companies 
and countries. British boards already varied widely in their structure and function: some 
were entirely or mainly non-executive (in the manner of the German Aufsichtsrat or 
supervisory board), some had a chairman and managing director with a “chief executive” 
                                                                                                                                                 
the other hand, the Fohlin data include German provincial bankers, while Cassis’s British figures included 
only London bankers. 
76 Cassis, City bankers, pp. 151, 153, 168.   37
role near to that of an American company president, while yet other boards constituted an 
effective working committee of the company’s senior executives. Many British bankers 
perhaps served on railway boards because they were seen as reliable, informed and 
trustworthy public trustees of very large businesses, with a responsibility to a range of 
stakeholders as well as shareholders. Certainly their presence there cannot easily be 
interpreted as designed to support securities issuance: blue chip British railways (and 
banks themselves) typically had sufficient market reputation to issue their own new 
securities, without significant financial intermediation: all they required was a 
stockbroker to negotiate the formalities of the additional Stock Exchange listing.
77 Other 
bankers were on boards for the direct financial knowledge and issuing services they had 
provided or might in future provide: a Baring long remained on the board of Guinness 
because the bank had sponsored its IPO; a Rothschild representative was on the board of 
De Beers and Rio Tinto because they were financial advisers and major shareholders. 
There was nothing to parallel the routine German banker membership of supervisory 
boards by virtue of Depotstimmrecht (representation of shareholder proxy votes), though 
there were parallels to German banker representation as substantial owners (as with 
Mannesmann or Rio Tinto) or as new issue quality certifiers. The latter practice was more 
common in Germany, but German bankers averaged 17 directorships (and one had as 
many as 35), while Cassis’s data suggests less pluralism in Britain. Pluralist German 
directors were certainly criticized at the time for devoting insufficient time to the job.
78 
                                                 
77 Whereas serially bankrupt American railroads understandably required the intermediation of bankers like 
J. P Morgan, who typically refused reconstruction deals unless he could be confident of control through a 
voting trust, see Tufano, “Business failure.” 
78 Economist, 10 August 1901, pp. 1217-8; see also Fohlin, Finance Capitalism, p. 35; Cassis, City bankers, 
p. 151.  Collins, “English bank development” is consistent with a picture of long-term bank lending and 
oversight, and aid to distressed firms, of the kind that is more frequently associated in the literature with the 
German system.    38
Britain had a more competitive and varied supply of financial services than other 
countries at this time and few British firms would have felt constrained to admit a banker 
to their board solely to guarantee access to capital, while bankers would have avoided 
getting saddled with such a relationship of need. Banker relationships motivated by 
access to more constrained financial channels may have been more common in both 
Germany and America, though there, too, industrialists balanced directors from several 
banks and broke free of banker control where they could. 
 
                                                                     VI 
 
                      Financial economists who discuss these matters appear to suffer from 
extreme schizophrenia.
79 Many picture the agency problem between directors and 
shareholders in Hobbesian state-of-nature terms: insider directors routinely and ruthlessly 
loot hapless investors, with no moral, cultural, legal or professional restraint on their 
naked self-interest, as they avidly feather their own nests. Other financial economists 
portray what, on the face of it, is a very different world: one in which investors, plagued 
by severe information asymmetries, willingly hand over successive, large tranches of 
cash to nice, quasi-monopolist, quality-certifiers like J. P. Morgan or Deutsche Bank, 
who, apparently, can be implicitly trusted, without a hint of agency problems. The real 
world of British corporate finance around 1900 contained recognizable elements of both 
these models, but I doubt whether many shrewd and informed market participants of the 
time would have swallowed either view whole. Rather the financial markets resemble a 
                                                 
79 A point nicely made in Allen, “Do financial institutions.” I am grateful to Yoshiro Miwa for drawing the 
point to my attention.   39
Schelling repeated game world, in which investors cautiously and skeptically learnt 
whom to trust, always keeping a sharp eye open for being taken for a ride and, when 
necessary, administering very real tits for tat. Meanwhile solid, but always potentially 
alienable, reputation was cultivated by many directors and many intermediaries, who had 
more to gain (in the longer run of repeated interactions) from delivering value to 
investors than from making a fast buck by cheating on one deal. This was not so much 
the unattractive “opportunism with guile” view of humanity posited by transactions cost 
theorists as the “trusting, fair behavior, with skepticism” more plausibly supported by 
current developments in behavioral and experimental economics. 
                     The complexity (and potential for wrong turnings as well as effective 
positive feedback) in such an iterative, evolutionary process can be glimpsed in a 1900 
snapshot of the brewing industry, shown in Table 1. There had been a boom in the 
flotation of brewery companies in Britain, following Baring’s successful IPO in 1886 of 
the Dublin brewer of Guinness stout, then probably the world’s largest producer of 
alcohol. Among the many other brewery issues was the more recent (1898) merger of 
three large London breweries into the second largest UK brewer, Watney, Combe, Reid. 
There is general agreement among the industry’s historians that this boom resulted in 
over-enthusiasm for public issues: Barings had probably under-priced the Guinness offer 
and it went to a considerable premium. There was consequently no shortage of capital in 
the industry; indeed arguably there was too much.
80 Investors could get a yield of only 
2.6% on consols and 2.9% on prime railway debentures, but brewery debentures paid  
                                                 
80 Gourvish and Wilson, British Brewing Industry, p. 263; Vaizey, Brewing Industry; Watson, “New Issues 
Market,” “Banks” and “Funding enterprise.”   The Investor’s Review, on which Table 1 is based , tracked 
down 122 more quoted British brewing companies than Watson found in the Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence, presumably mostly small provincial issues.   40
     Table 1. The Investment Performance of Quoted Brewery Companies in early 1900. 
                                        Number of     Nominal     Market    Average   Appreciation/ 
                                        Companies     Value of   Value of       Size       Depreciation 
                                                                Capital       Capital       ₤M                 % 
                                                                   ₤M             ₤M 
 
Guinness                                  1                 5.2          14.3           14.3             +175 
 
Watney, Combe, Reid              1               12.7          13.4           13.4                 +5 
 
Other London-listed UK      164               81.6          74.8             0.46                -9 
 
Provincially-listed UK          272              15.2          23.4             0.09              +54 
 
London-listed Overseas         na                14.4           7.0              na                 -51 
 
Total                                       na                129          132                na                 +2 
 
                               Source: Investor’s Review, 19 May 1900, pp. 686-87; author’s 
                               calculations for Guinness and Watney. 
 
3.9% and, at that rate, the brewers still considered themselves better off than borrowing 
the money from banks at 4-5%. The plentiful public subscriptions to fixed interest - and  
equity - issues not only financed expansion of brewing plant, but vertical integration 
forward to the ownership of pubs. Although Guinness did not follow this strategy (relying 
on its brand reputation and advertising to market its product), most British breweries did, 
as stricter licensing laws restricted the number of outlets, increasing an already strong 
tendency to tying pubs. With restricted new entry into beer retailing, the strategy of 
forward integration was initially profitable, but increased beer taxes and the retail 
restrictions successfully restrained demand: the industry was about to experience a 
sustained decline in sales, which would produce capital losses for some investors.
81 One 
of the most prolific promoters of brewery issues, Henry Osborne O’Hagan, recounts how 
                                                 
81As was already feared by informed commentators, see Investor’s Review, 6 January 1900, pp. 3-4.   41
he found the price asked by brewery vendors increasing; so he sought overseas 
alternatives, in the USA and elsewhere, in a bid to supply investor demand with better 
value securities (hence the bottom row of the table).
82  
                  The output of the brewing industry in Germany and the United States was 
only slightly larger than that in the UK, but finance and organization varied considerably 
among the three.
83 Most large American breweries were in family ownership (the NYSE 
listed no breweries at all) and none were as large as the largest British breweries. In 
Germany, too, breweries were small and family-owned, though dozens were quoted on 
the Berlin and regional stock exchanges.
84 It is, in fact, far from obvious that there were 
great advantages in substantially divorcing ownership from control in this industry and 
stronger family ownership seems to have served Americans and Germans perfectly well. 
By contrast, the scale of British stock exchange investors’ incursions into brewing was 
spectacular, indeed, perhaps excessive. The value of the brewery securities in Table 1 
alone exceeded that of all the domestic industrial equities (including breweries) quoted 
on the Berlin exchange at that time!
85 Moreover, as the low average sizes in the fourth 
column suggest, even in Britain small family breweries, distributing barrels locally by 
horse and dray, remained viable. Indeed, by the yardstick of appreciation in securities 
values over par (the last column in the table), the smaller provincial issues seem to have 
                                                 
82 O’Hagan, Leaves. 
83 In 1899, beer production in Germany was 68 million hectoliters, in the United States 65 million 
hectoliters and in the UK 61 million hectoliters (Picard, Bilan, p. 431). 
84 The 66 quoted German brewery AGs had a nominal capital totaling ₤11 million (less than Watney 
Combe Reid alone) and averaging ₤0.16 million in 1900 (much smaller than the typical British listed 
brewery in Table 1), see Wagon, Finanzielle Entwicklung, p. 195. 
85 Berlin’s industrial equities were worth only £107 million in early 1900 and even with bond and 
preference share values added (as they are in the British brewery data) would have only modestly exceeded 
the value of breweries alone in Britain. The table only includes quoted British brewery securities; there 
were also substantial unquoted ordinary shares in firms whose other securities were quoted (Gourvish and 
Wilson, British Brewing Industry, pp. 262-263, 266, 384), as well as thousands of unquoted breweries.   42
performed significantly better (+54%) than the general run of larger London-quoted 
breweries (-9%), suggesting that, after family ownership was diluted by stock exchange 
flotation, local information networks and monitoring had real advantages. As the editor 
of the Economist put it, in relation to IPOs generally: “A really good thing from Glasgow, 
or Yorkshire, or Lancashire, or the Midlands, seldom comes to London to be floated on 
the public. The insiders naturally keep it to themselves and their friends.”
86 It is evident 
that efficient production for local markets was possible at a wide range of sizes, though 
scientific processes were increasingly applied to brewing beer, bottling was being 
mechanized and there were significant scale economies in capital-intensive, urban plants. 
Yet Guinness and the Burton ale brewers in the UK (and some US and German 
equivalents) were still exceptional in being able to charge premium prices in broader 
markets than their home city, distributing beer by rail and ship on a national scale and for 
export. 
                        Guinness (on whose board a Baring, involved since handling its IPO in 
1886, still served) generally retained investor confidence and justifiably so. The firm had 
consistently ploughed back substantial profits into the business, in addition to paying 
generous dividends.
87 It also, arguably, had the largest, most effective and most 
professional management hierarchy of any world brewing company, which proved 
capable of further developing large-scale production, brand value and global distribution. 
One indicator of its exceptional management quality familiar to most of us now – but still 
then a trade secret - is that, every time we use a t-statistic, we are indebted to William 
Gossett, one among many Oxbridge scientists recruited to the Dublin management team 
                                                 
86 Hirst, Stock Exchange, p. 216. 
87 Investor’s Review, 11 August 1900, pp. 171-172.   43
from 1893 by Claude Guinness. This early graduate recruitment program enabled the 
company to catch up with Paris, Copenhagen and Munich in the application of 
biochemistry and statistics to industrial processes and management.
88 Gossett spent his 
whole career with the firm and, after the Irish Free State was established, became 
managing director of Guinness’s new British mainland subsidiary. He invented the t-
statistic to determine the sample size required for reliable testing of Guinness quality and 
later applied it to measuring the effectiveness of advertising.
89  
               There were in 1900 rather more London market doubts about Watney Combe 
Reid. Its chairman, the former family owner of the Combe third of the merger, Cosmo 
Bonsor M.P., was also a director of the Bank of England and of the South Eastern 
Railway. Essentially he and the other families had unloaded their interests at the top of 
the long bull market in brewery shares: owners were in a better position than outside 
shareholders to judge when profits had peaked.
90 Like many breweries it was to meet 
                                                 
88 The t-statistic was known to an earlier generation of statisticians as “Student’s t,” that being the 
pseudonym Gossett used in launching it on the world in Biometrika 1908, see Dennison and MacDonagh, 
Guinness, pp. 89-90. 
89 Ibid, pp. 16-38; Investor’s Review, 27 October 1900, pp. 518-520. The prevailing interpretations of 
Guinness perfectly reflect the rose-colored Whig bias of much American writing and the reverse “declinist” 
bias of the British. One financial columnist (Kay, “The scholars behind the stout”) recounts how his editor 
at the Financial Times queried his (correct) account of the invention of the t-statistic as inherently 
implausible. By contrast, Chandler’s unflattering assessment (Scale, p. 267) of Guinness’s marketing scale 
and skill, relative to Pabst, Schlitz, Anheuser Busch, Schultheiss and other brewers in the United States and 
Germany, strikingly lacks support. Guinness at the turn of the century had two-thirds of the Irish market, 
extensive distribution on the British mainland and sold nearly 5% of its output in the USA and other 
overseas markets, while the named German and American firms were smaller by obvious indicators such as 
barrelage or capital. Chandler may have been misled by the US habit – which amused contemporary 
Europeans as much as the proverbial postwar Texans - of claiming to have the biggest and best in 
everything, though that was only sometimes true. For example, it was routinely claimed in the 1890s that 
Busch’s St Louis brewery was the “largest brewing establishment in the world” and similar claims were 
made for Pabst’s Milwaukee brewery (Muirhead, United States, p. 276; Plavchan, History, p. 65). 
Guinness’s Dublin output was a lot larger and even British-owned US brewery mergers, such as St Louis 
Breweries and Milwaukee & Chicago Breweries, had higher outputs. (Ibid, p. 230; Dennison and 
MacDonagh, Guinness, pp. 37-39; Duncan, Manual, pp. 279, 282. Note that the old English gallon - still in 
1900 used in the USA - was one-sixth smaller than the standard Imperial gallon used in the UK from 1824). 
90 Economist, 3 November 1900, pp. 1533-1534; Gourvish and Wilson, British Brewing Industry, p. 297, 
311.   44
difficulties from 1900, but Bonsor was frank with the shareholders, dismissed the 
managing director and reduced the capital to a more realistic level. Watney weathered the 
storm and remained a large producer. Allsopp’s, a large Burton brewer, had even more 
grossly overpaid for assets and overoptimistically invested in a large, new lager brewery 
under the management of the recklessly spendthrift Percy Allsopp. In 1900 the two-thirds 
of the shareholders who had subscribed to the public issue of ordinary shares turfed him 
out and installed a new chairman.
91 There is, then, clear evidence that mistakes had been 
made – mistakes of overinvestment and of poor director selection - but they were being 
corrected. And the investors who had trusted in Bass and Worthington - Allsopp’s two 
major Burton rivals - were to do well in the long term, though the family owners (like 
most German and American brewers) kept the ordinaries to themselves at this time. 
                    British brewery companies operating overseas (the fifth line in the table) - 
though they often had reputable and experienced British brewers on their boards – had 
performed particularly poorly. Those in South Africa and Germany generally did better 
than those in the USA and Australia (where the local rogues enjoyed ripping off innocent 
foreign capitalists). In the USA, for example, some of the best family brewers had 
refused to sell to British (and American) financiers, while others had sold out, then 
started up rival breweries. More generally, the supervision and monitoring of distant 
enterprises in competitive industries was perhaps one magnification too far of the London 
versus provincial information problem.
92 Truly multinational enterprises in the drinks 
industry did not prosper until the changed conditions after World War Two. 
                                                 
91 Ibid, p. 311; Investor’s Monthly Manual, 31 August 1900, p. 446; Economist, 24 August 1901, p. 1281; 
Watson, “Banks, “ p. 77. 
92 Baron, Brewed, pp. 268-72. The total for foreign breweries includes only companies registered and/or 
quoted in Britain. It excludes the securities of British capitalists resident overseas, like those who for   45
                         Complex lessons were, then, slowly being learned by investors and by 
managers, in Britain and in the world of which it was in 1900 the financial center. It is 
tempting to conclude that, because, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, two London-
headquartered multinational firms were still the largest in the world alcoholic drinks 
industry, that city’s early and precociously varied experimentation with corporate 
governance in this sector was an evident success. After all, one of these modern corporate 
giants, Diageo, is a merger of the leading firm in Table 1 – Guinness – with Distillers (the 
leading Scotch whisky producer), while the other - SAB Miller - is a merger of South 
African Breweries (an 1895 foundation appearing in the fifth line Table 1, which, after a 
spell headquartered in Johannesburg, returned to its London origins) with the Miller beer 
division of Philip Morris (in 1900 a small London cigarette producer, which later 
migrated to America and, among other things, acquired Miller). In fact, of course, these 
long-run outcomes had more complex, constantly mutating and varied causes, among 
which the sterling services of the US and German governments in support of British 
corporations’ global alcoholic dominance should not be forgotten. (Prohibition in 1917-
1933 ensured that British firms could develop without challenge, while government 
regulation - the Reinheitsgebot - kept German brewers inefficiently small in subsequent 
decades). Moreover, after many years of efficient, family-controlled, professional 
management, Guinness fell into the hands of a professional manager that the courts 
branded a corporate crook for share price manipulation in the 1980s. Its survival, despite 
                                                                                                                                                 
decades ran the Yokohama-based Japan Brewing Company (registered as a British Hong Kong company, 
with $HK shares, but traded “over the counter” in Tokyo) before selling out in 1907 to Mitsubishi (who 
renamed it after its famous brand, Kirin). Such hands-on local expatriate management appears to have been 
more successful than arms-length transoceanic investment in this industry.   46
that disreputable episode, clearly owes more to its deeply-rooted managerial and 
marketing capabilities than to the immutability of good corporate governance practices.
93  
                 The case of the global drinks industry supports the view that the British – like 
other nations - had only equivocal success in pioneering solutions to the complex and 
constantly changing problems of corporate governance. It remains a mistake to seek in 
British governance innovations around 1900 – impressive as they are by contemporary 
standards - the roots of long-run decline or success, in the reductionist mode so 
ridiculously pursued in Whig modernization theory. Business reality is more complex and 
messy than that. If it were not so, you would have concluded your reading of this article 
by clearly understanding the magic formula by which corporations, everywhere and 
forever, can be efficiently governed by wise, reputed, incentivized, transparent and 
trustworthy directors. Like the many thousands listed in London’s Directory of Directors 
in 1900, you do not inhabit such a world, though – then, as now – these included people 
diligently and creatively working toward it. They did so while trying to earn a more-or-
less honest penny or two, within a balanced system of corporate law, professional 
practice and ethical norms that left room for experiment and enterprise, but, 
unsurprisingly, was to prove capable of further improvement. That involved a movement 
to more intensive, rules-based and legally-mandated regulation. From the 1930s that 
trend was led by the United States, though London has generally followed Washington 
and New York along this path. Yet, today - in the City’s distinctive self-regulation of 
take-over bids, in its voluntary (“comply or explain”) corporate governance code and in 
its caution on emulating the onerous, box-ticking, manufactured “ethics” of Sarbanes-
Oxley - faint traces still remain of London’s 1900 view: that enterprise, flexibility and 
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shareholder protection are more effectively bolstered by values, standards, voluntary 
compliance and rare (but decisive and equitable) judicial interventions, than by complex 
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